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ARTICLE
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANGS IN THE
BALANCE: RESURRECTING THE WARRANT

REQUIREMENT THROUGH STRICT SCRUTINY
Wayne D. Holly*
In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs,
hoveredfor an instant like a blue-bottle, and dartedaway again with
a curvingflight. It was the Police Patrol,snooping into people's
windows. The patrols did not matter, however. Only the thought
police mattered'

Introduction
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,2
which limits the government's power to search for and seize evidence

'B.A., 1993, Rhode Island College; J.D., 1996, New York Law School. The author was
the 1996 recipient of the professor Vincent LoLordo Award for Excellence in Administration
of Criminal Justice. He is currently an associate in the New York law firm of Tracy L.
Klestadt & Associates which practices bankruptcy and commercial law litigation. Before
joining the firm, the author aided in representing criminal defendants, at the trial and
appellate level, in the state courts of Rhode Island, New York and New Jersey as well as the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island and the First Circuit Court of
Appeals. The author gratefully acknowledges the substantial editorial assistance of the

editors and staff of the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights.
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 6 (Signet Classic ed. 1950).
2 The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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against those accused of crimes, is not very popular in today's political

climate.'
As Americans become increasingly dismayed by the
"technicalities" of search and seizure law which "set the guilty free,"4 the
U.S. Congress has swiftly responded to weaken current restrictions on
the power of the government to search without a warrant.' The U.S.
3See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H1326-03, 1329 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Gekas). During debate on H.R. 666, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), which would permit
evidence obtained during a "good faith" warrantless search to be used in federal criminal
trials, Mr. Gekas commented:
[N]othing infuriates the public more than the spectacle of a criminal
standing before the judge, facing his prosecutors and learning right there
in open court that... the judge dismisse[d] his case... for the sake of
a technicality that we have seen over and over and over again ...
[T]hat infuriates the American public.... Id.
See also PAUL CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW YORK CITY 191 (1969)
("The Fourth Amendment has never enjoyed much popularity, because it frequently appears
as the champion of the guilty."); Daniel J. Polatsek, Note, Thermal Imaging and the Fourth
Amendment: Pushing the Katz Test Towards Terminal Velocity, 13 J. MARSHALL J."
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 453 (1995)("Fourth Amendment liberties are currently receding
amidst the current tide of crime-fighting fever."). David E. Rovella, Drug Seizure Proposal
Condemned Experts Say Lowering ofLegal StandardWould Violate 4th Amendment, NAT'L.
L.J., Mar. 31, 1997, at A6 (describing law reform proposal which would permit warrantless
police searches "at all hours," without probable cause, "as a silver bullet in the war on drugs"
but which would provide search targets with freedom from prosecution for drug crimes
uncovered by the searches).
'See Richard L. Berke, Poll Finds Public Doubts Key Parts of G.O.P. 's Agenda, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at AI (referring to H.R. 666, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) which
would create a "good faith" exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches and
noting that "proponents of the bill argued that it would reduce the likelihood that criminals
would get off on technicalities"); Katharine Q. Seelye, Anti-Crime Bill as PoliticalDispute:
President and G.O.P. Define the Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1995, at A16 (commenting that
"constitutional safeguards are political losers with a public fed up with criminals getting off
on technicalities").
'See H.R. 666, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (bill permitting the use in federal criminal
trials of evidence obtained in a "good faith" warrantless search). The bill may go too far
however, even for a public which views crime as a high priority. See Berke, supra note 4,
at Al (noting that latest New York Times/CBS News Poll revealed that 69% of Americans
oppose the House bill); see also ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, LAWS AGAINST MARIJUANA: THE
PRICE WE PAY 164 (1975) ("In an era when crime has become the major concern of so many
of their constituents, legislators tend to expand, not contract, the powers of the police.").
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Supreme Court has also moved rapidly in this direction.6 Perceiving
America's concern over drugs and violence, 7 both the Court' and the

6
See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 884 (1997) (holding that police may order
a passenger of a lawfully stopped vehicle to exit the vehicle "as a matter of course" without
any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 116 S. Ct. 2485
(1996) (reaffirming "automobile exception" to warrant requirement and holding that police
may lawfully search motor vehicles upon probable cause, without first obtaining a warrant,
even in the absence of exigency); Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (holding
irrelevant to Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" analysis whether police decision to stop
and search, upon probable cause to believe traffic infraction has occurred, was mere pretext
for desire to search for drugs; so long as probable cause exists, officer's motivation is
irrelevant); Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996) (holding that lawfully seized individual
need not be advised that he is free to leave in order to voluntarily consent to search);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (validating suspicionless drug
urinalysis testing of students as requirement of participating in interscholastic athletics);
Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995) (holding that Exclusionary Rule does not require
suppression of marijuana evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment where officer
relied upon police record containing erroneous information resulting from error by employee
of Court Clerk).
7
See Jeff Meyers, Run on Guns, Three Years After the L.A. Riots Shock Suburbia Out Of
Its Sense Of Security, Sale Of Weapons Among Ordinary Citizens Continues to Rise
Throughout the Country, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1995, at J8 (noting that "according to a Los
Angeles Times Poll last year, 43% of Americans put crime issues at the top of the list of the
country's most important problems . . ."); Kristen Schiller, New Jersey Q&A: Robert
Menendez; A Voice in Congressfor Cuban Affairs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1994, at § 13NJ at
3 (noting Representative Menendez as saying that "[tihe American public has said that
violent crime is one of its foremost concerns").
' See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 600 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("No
impartial observer could criticize this Court for hindering the progress of the war on drugs.
On the contrary... this Court has become a loyal foot soldier in the Executive's fight against
crime."); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 654 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's validation of suspicionless drug and alcohol testing of
certain railroad employees and noting that "[a] majority of this Court, swept away by
society's obsession with stopping the scourge of illegal drugs, today succumbs to... popular
pressures"); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 686 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's validation of U.S. Customs Service program of
warrantless drug testing of certain employees and noting "[w]hat better way to show that the
Government is serious about its 'war on drugs' than to subject its employees ... to [an]
invasion of their privacy and affront to their dignity?").
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Congress,9 armed with catchy slogans such as "War on Drugs"'" and
-"Contract with America,"" have led a frontal assault upon Fourth
Amendment rights. Fashionable intolerance for those accused of crime
soon promises to operate as a death knell for the Fourth Amendment's

guarantee of security from overzealous and arbitrary police action. 2
While the Framers of the Constitution took great strides toward
insulating the federal judiciary from the pressures of shifting political
majorities, 3 the federal courts' independence today appears to be in
jeopardy. Led by the Supreme Court of the United States, the federal
courts have been swept into the moment's hue and cry and have
abdicated their obligation to vigorously protect the liberties recognized

9 See, e.g., H.R. 666, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995) (creating "good faith" exception to
Exclusionary Rule which excludes, from federal criminal trials, the use of evidence obtained
from unlawful searches).
"' E.g., 141 CONG. REC. E9-02 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Solomon)
("[W]e cannot solve the crime and violence problems which plague this country without an
all-out war on drugs. Make no mistake about it. This Republican-controlled Congress will
pay [sic] a major role in the war on drugs.").
" See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK
ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (Ed Gillespie & Bob
Schellhas eds., 1994); Berke, supra note 4, at Al (explaining that the "'Contract With
America' [is] the House Republicans' political manifesto").
2 Cf Skinner, 489 U.S. at 636 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority decision
upholding suspicionless drug testing of certain railroad employees and asserting that "[tihe
Court today takes its longest step yet toward reading the probable-cause requirement out of
the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (commenting in response to majority decision to admit evidence obtained by
officer reasonably relying on an invalid warrant that "[i]t now appears that the Court's
victory over the Fourth Amendment is complete").
" See generally U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § I (providing life tenure for federal judges during
good behavior whose salary may not be diminished while in office); THE FEDERALIST No.
78 (Alexander Hamilton). See also ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

26 (1962) (noting that the judiciary's independence permits federal judges to "follow the
ways of the scholar" when interpreting the Constitution); GEOFFREY R.. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 36 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that "those who are subject to political
pressures . . . are likely to have the process of interpretation infected or distorted by
prevailing political sentiments").
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by the Fourth Amendment. 4 Accordingly, this Article seeks to reaffirm
the central meaning of the Amendment and the need for scrupulous
attention to the values which it protects.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from
"unreasonable"' 5 searches and seizures by government officials. 6 It
"reflects experience with police excesses"'17 and is most often recognized
as embodying general protection of privacy interests." Search and
seizure law seeks to limit unfettered government discretion in the
enforcement of law. 9 The Amendment requires both that searches and

" The series of developments in the recent case of United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp.
232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), decision vacated on reconsideration,921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), motion for recusal denied, 926 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), arguably illustrate the
pernicious influence of politics on federal judicial decision-making in search and seizure
cases.
IsSee supra note 2.
16 The Fourth Amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, places limits only
on government action. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). "Governmental
action," however, is not limited to action taken by government officials. Searches by private
individuals acting as "instruments of the state," where there is substantial governmental
acquiescence in the conduct of the private person, may be deemed government action for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.
1987); United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).
"7Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment is designed "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by law
enforcement officials").
"8See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967) (rejecting common law
property approach to Fourth Amendment in favor of one which protects legitimate privacy
expectations). Other decisions have recognized that the Amendment protects more then just
privacy values. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1985) (recognizing that Fourth
Amendment protects individual interest in bodily integrity); United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (holding that Fourth Amendment protects possessory interest in
property); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (observing that Fourth
Amendment protects individual interest in personal dignity); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367
U.S. 717, 724 (1961) (recognizing that Fourth Amendment historically has protected
freedom of expression).
19See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
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seizures be "reasonable"2 and that warrants only be issued upon a
showing of "probable cause.""1
The central Fourth Amendment inquiry is thus directed to the
meaning of a "reasonable" search or seizure and whether the structure of
the Amendment provides an interpretative aid to its ambiguous
language.22 The ambiguity of the Amendment is largely a product of the
unclear relationship between its substantive and procedural clauses.23
Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court read the
Amendment as requiring a warrant for a search unless the circumstances

20 U.S. CONST. amend.

2

IV.

Id. The phrase "probable cause" is not defined by the Amendment. However, the

Supreme Court has determined that probable cause to search "exists where 'the facts and
circumstances within [the officials'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that a criminal offense had occurred and the evidence would be found in the
suspected place." (Brackets in original). New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 358 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
22As one scholar has noted, the Fourth Amendment "has the virtue of brevity and the vice
of ambiguity." JACOB LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 29

(1966). While "reasonableness" is certainly central to Fourth Amendment analysis, the
threshold Fourth Amendment inquiry is whether a "search" has occurred within the meaning
of the Amendment. A search within the meaning of the Amendment occurs when a
government official invades an expectation of privacy "that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The Fourth Amendment's scope thus extends only to objectively "reasonable" or "legitimate"
privacy expectations. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1975) (noting that
"reasonable" and "legitimate" expectations of privacy are synonymous for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment).
23In one view, the Fourth Amendment is to be read in toto, the requirement for warrants
based upon probable cause seen as defining the standard for reasonable searches. In the
other view, these two clauses are to be read in the alternative, with those searches made
incident to a warrant being per se reasonable, but anticipating that other searches might occur
which would be reasonable without recourse to a warrant. POLYviOS G. POLYVIOU, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW 130 (1982); Silas Wasserstrom, The
Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257, 282 (1984); see also
discussion infra Part I.A.
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involved fell into a "narrow" group of exceptions.2 4 When the Court
departed from this general rule, it held that "as a minimum requirement,"
probable cause is required of a lawful warrantless search." However,
this approach has steadily given way to a "general reasonableness"
approach which requires "balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails"26 in order to determine whether a
warrantless search was reasonable without using either probable cause
or a warrant as a presumptive test.2 7 Under the balancing approach, the
Court has upheld warrantless searches on mere "reasonable suspicion,"
a quantum of proof even less than probable cause. 8 In other "limited
circumstances," the balancing method has permitted the Court to uphold
warrantless searches without any degree of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. 9 The result of these rules-oriented and balancing

24The Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967), announced that "searches

conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions." The presumption of unreasonableness, however, does not
extend to warrantless arrests. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). The Court has
made clear that searches implicate different interests than seizures. See, e.g., Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) ("A search compromises the individual interest in
privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion over his or her person or property.").
This Article's discussion of the Fourth Amendment is directed only to warrantless searches.
25Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (noting that the "familiar threshold standard of probable cause...
accomodate[s] the factors relevant to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment"); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968) ("[Our] cases
... have always insisted that officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause."); New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) ("Ordinarily a search--even one
that may be permissibly carried out without a warrant-must be based upon probable
cause."); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975) ("[T]he court always ha[s]
regarded probable cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search.").
26Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
27 See cases cited infra note 106.
28

See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (holding warrantless "protective
sweep" of house in which arrest is made reasonable when based upon reasonable suspicion);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding "pat-down/frisk" search reasonable under Fourth
Amendment where based upon reasonable suspicion).
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approaches has been a "complicated and technical . . . [F]ourth
[A]mendment jurisprudence.., riddled with complex and ambiguous
decisions."3
The Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment have resulted in "an inconsistent jurisprudence that has
been with us for years."3

29

See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (upholding random

suspicionless drug testing of student athletes participating in interscholastic athletics);
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (upholding suspicionless
stops for questioning and examination at sobriety checkpoint); Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of
certain Customs Service employees); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703-04 (1987)
(upholding suspicionless "administrative inspections" of "closely regulated" industries);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545-50 (1976) (upholding suspicionless
stops for questioning or examination at fixed Border Patrol checkpoints). But see Chandler
v. Miller, No. 96-126, 1997 WL 176382 (U.S. S. Ct. Apr. 15, 1997) (invalidating Georgia
statute which required candidates for certain elective offices to certify that they have taken
a timely urinalysis drug test and that the result was negative).
30 Denise Marie Cloutier, Arizona v. Hicks: The Failure To Recognize Limited
Inspections As Reasonable In Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence,24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 351 (1991).
"' California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). The leading
scholars are virtually unanimous in their criticism both of the confusion created by the
Court's ambiguities and the complex nature of Fourth Amendment law. See, e.g., Albert W.
Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 287
(1984) (noting that "substantive Fourth Amendment law [is] incomprehensible"); Anthony
G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974) ("For
clarity and consistency, the law of the Fourth Amendment is not the Supreme Court's most
successful product."); Ronald Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall
of Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763 ("[A]ttempting to comprehend the Fourth
Amendment cases is like looking into the looking glass with Alice."); Craig Bradley, Two
Models of the FourthAmendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1501 (1985) (noting that Fourth
Amendment law "is so full of fictitious rules and multifaceted exceptions (and exceptions
to those rules) that the most that could be said of anyone's grasp of the doctrine is that 'he
sees where most of the problems are'); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an
Imperfect World: On Drawing 'BrightLines'and 'Good Faith,' 43 U. PITr. L. REV. 307, 309
(1982) ("The constitutional law of search and seizure... is exceedingly detailed. [It] bears
a position to the Fourth Amendment comparable to that of the Internal Revenue Code to the
Sixteenth Amendment."); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing
the Mischiefof Camaraand Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383 (1988) ("In its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court has struggled continually, and
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The Court's apparent inability to develop an understandable
analytic model for testing the validity of warrantless searches under the
Fourth Amendment 32 is exemplified by its recent movement toward a
general reasonableness balancing approach.33 This balancing method of

constitutional adjudication resembles the Court's deferential "rational
basis"34 approach to most equal protection claims raised under the
Fourteenth Amendment.35 The Court reviews warrantless searches by
employing a rule of reason, upholding the search if it is rationally related

unsuccessfully, to develop a coherent analytical framework."); Silas J.Wasserstrom & Louis
M. Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as ConstitutionalTheory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 20 (1988)
("[T]here is virtual unanimity, transcending normal ideological dispute, that the Court simply
has made a mess of search and seizure law").
32The Court's failure in this regard is particularly troubling in light of the Court's own
realization that "a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have
only limited time and expertise -to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests
involved in the specific circumstances they confront." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
213-14 (1979).
" See Lee Anne Fritzler, Optimality in FourthAmendment Law, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
473, 474 (1990) ("In recent years... the Court has all but abandoned.., bright line rules
and has resorted more often to a flexible 'balancing' approach in which the 'reasonableness'
term of the Fourth Amendment reigns."); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward A
General Reasonableness Interpretationof the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
119, 129 (1989) ("The Court's turn away from the specific commands of the warrant clause
and toward a balancing test of general reasonableness is now evident.").
" See STONE ET AL., supra note 13, at 541 (noting that rational basis, or "low-level"
scrutiny is most often applied to equal protection claims). Under rational basis review, state
action is presumed constitutional and will be upheld if rationally related to some legitimate
state interest. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) (denying taxpayer challenge to
California property tax system under rational basis review). State action is rarely struck
down under this standard. STONE ET AL., supra note 13, at 541.
" This point was recently echoed by Justice Stevens dissenting in Maryland v. Wilson,
117 S.Ct. 882, 890 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Criticizing the majority's holding that
police may order passengers to exit a lawfully stopped automobile as a matter of course
without any individualized suspicion, Justice Stevens commented, "[t]he Court's conclusion
seems to rest on the assumption that the constitutional protection against 'unreasonable'
seizures requires nothing more than a hypothetically rational basis for intrusions on
individual liberty").
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to some legitimate government objective.36 This view of Fourth
Amendment rights is inconsistent with the Court's treatment of other
"fundamental rights,"37 and provides insufficient protection to the
individual's interest in privacy and personal security. 8 At the same time,
the deferential balancing method fails to provide clear guidance to law
enforcement.39
This Article will examine the Supreme Court's traditional view
of the Warrant Clause4" and the eventual abandonment of the warrant
preference view. 4 It will detail the current ad hoc balancing approach
to reviewing warrantless searches and argue that such an approach
inappropriately resembles the deferential "rational basis" standard of
Equal Protection jurisprudence.42 The Article argues that the current
balancing approach should be abandoned and proposes that the Court
return to the warrant requirement and examine warrantless searches with
"strict scrutiny," employing a "least intrusive alternative"43 requirement
because Fourth Amendment rights are at least as fundamental as other
36

Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 197, 199-200, 210 (1993) (noting and criticizing the Court's deferential "rationality"
approach to police action under Fourth Amendment in which Court asks "whether they have
acted in a reasonable and rational manner").
" The Court has deemed the Fourth Amendment a "fundamental" right for purposes of
incorporating its guarantees into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Wolfv. Colorado,338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). In the Equal Protection context, the Court has
replaced "rational basis" review with "strict scrutiny" where state action interferes with a
"fundamental right." E.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 456 (1988).
Strict scrutiny has not been applied in the Fourth Amendment warrantless search context,
however.
38The "rational basis" approach to reviewing police action under the Fourth Amendment
fails to recognize that mistrust of government power is the core meaning of the Amendment's
protections. See cases cited supra note 17 and accompanying text.
"9See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 466 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority for failing to provide law enforcement with workable guidelines); see also infra
note 129.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra notes 54-74 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
13 See infra Part 1V.C.
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rights which the Court closely scrutinizes." The Article closely
examines each requirement of the proposed standard requiring, inter
alia, the government to prove that a search without a warrant was
45
necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest.

I. Warrantsand Reasonableness
A. Opposing Viewpoints
The Fourth Amendment, like many provisions of the U.S.
Constitution, is concise and exceedingly ambiguous.46 While the
Amendment requires, in its substantive clause, that searches be
"reasonable," it provides, in its procedural clause, that warrants be issued
only upon probable cause.47 The relationship between these clauses has
long been thought of as a key to the central meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.4 8
Two views have traditionally dominated the debate over the
relationship between the clauses.49 The "warrant preference view"
maintains that, except in extreme circumstances, a warrant must be

44See discussion, infra Part
45

IV.C.

See infra Part IV.A-C.
4 The Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement, like other constitutional values
such as "Due Process," "Equal Protection," "freedom of speech," and "cruel and unusual
punishment," is what Justice Marshall recognized as one of the "great outlines" of the
Constitution. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
4 See supra note 2.
48 See Sundby, supra note 31, at 384 (1988) ("[Rleconciling the warrant and
reasonableness clauses... goes to the very core of the amendment's meaning and purpose.").
Cf.STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 56 (4th

ed. 1992) ("The theory of the Fourth Amendment ...in large part is the theory of the
warrant clause ...").
49See POLYVIOU, supra note 23; see generally Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth
Amendment's Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1389, 1389-96 (1989) (discussing the

historical relationship between the reasonableness and Warrant Clauses).
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obtained prior to a search in order to meet the "reasonableness" standard
of the Fourth Amendment." A significant opposing view asserts that the
clauses are distinct and that the reasonableness of a search neither
necessarily nor presumptively turns on the existence of a warrant."
While throughout the years the Court has seemed "unable to
decide whether the [warrant] rule is or is not a constitutional
command,"52 until recently, the Court had expressed a theoretical

s0See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (announcing that "[sjearches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions"). The "warrant preference view" was perhaps most ardently
supported by Justice Frankfurter who wrote:
[Tihe Framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a
search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only
exceptions justified by absolute necessity.... What is the test of reason
which makes a search reasonable?... There must be a warrant to permit
search.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
51E.g., Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 60 (holding warrant not a prerequisite to a lawful search
after a valid arrest). Since his appointment, Chief Justice Rehnquist has been the Court's
most vocal opponent of the "warrant preference view." See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453
U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the Amendment's text does not
support "judicially created preference for a warrant"); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204, 224-25 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 406 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that reasonableness is to
be determined by balancing rather than presuming from lack of a warrant).
52James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the Warrant
Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1103, 1104 (1992). In 1925, the Court espoused the
warrant view in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that automobile
searches were an exception to the warrant requirement). Throughout the 1930's and 1940's
the Court continued this approach. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451
(1948) (warrantless search demands exceptional circumstances). Yet in 1950, the Court
changed course holding in United States v. Rabinowitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1950) that the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment did not require a warrant to precede
a search. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 65-66. By the 1960's the Court again reverted to the
warrant preference view. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ("[S]earches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions"). The theoretical preference for warrants continued through the 1980s. See, e.g.,
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preference for the traditional warrant requirement, albeit without strictly
enforcing it. Even the theoretical rule, however, began to ring hollow
in light of the developing catalogue of numerous exceptions. 3

B. The Demise of the WarrantRequirement:
The Rapid Cataloguing of Exceptions
Although the Court's traditional view of the Fourth Amendment
imposes a requirement that government officials obtain a warrant prior
to a search, 4 the Court rarely declines a government request to exempt
it from the warrant requirement." This juxtaposition of theory and
practice has been criticized for both its "hypocrisy" 6 and the confusion

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (upholding general rule that searches of
home without warrant are unreasonable); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 394 (1978)
(noting as "cardinal principle" that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (statint that the Fourth Amendment "'requires a
magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home."'
(quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 56 (1948)). The modem Court, too, has
accepted this approach.
" See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 369 (1993) (citing with approval a rule that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable while upholding search conducted without
warrant).
14 Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20 (1984) (noting that warrant requirement
"was
not a principle freshly coined for the occasion in Katz, but rather represented this Court's
longstanding understanding of the relationship between the two clauses of the Fourth
Amendment").
" See cases cited infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. Cf Tomkovicz, supra note
52, passim. But cf Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (rejecting invitation to
create exception to search without a warrant for felony arrestee in home of third person);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (rejecting "murder scene" exception to Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement).
56William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881
(1991). See William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 754 (1949)
(criticizing Court for "chant[ing] ... the immutability of a rule" in order to continue "the
outward appearance of stability").
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Although the Court frequently asserts that

warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable,58 it frequently
holds that the government's interest in conducting such searches, on

balance, outweighs the individual's Fourth Amendment right to the
additional security provided by the warrant procedure.59 Thus, despite
the Court's asserted preference for warrants, it is clear that its practice is
fundamentally inconsistent with its theory.6" In fact, "the 'warrant
requirement' ha[s] become so riddled with exceptions that it [i]s
basically unrecognizable."'" Under the rubric of the "special needs"62

5 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("[Tihere can be no clarity in this area unless we make up our minds, and unless the
principles we express comport with the actions we take"); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 466 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for failing to provide law
enforcement with workable guidelines); see also sources cited supra note 31.
8 E.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 372 (1993) ("Time and again, this Court has
observed that searches... conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to
a few-specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.") (citations omitted).
" See cases cited infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
60See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 48, at 33 ("The thought of a tough, sweeping per
se rule [against warrantless searches] yielding only to the most demanding claims for
exceptions is at odds with reality."); Bradley, supra note 31, at 1475 (noting that the warrant
requirement "is theory, not fact"); James B. Haddad, Well DelineatedExceptions, Claims of
Sham, and FourfoldProbableCause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 199 (1977) ("The
per se rule fails to reflect judicial practice."); Stuntz, supra note 56, at 882 (noting that "in
practice warrants are the exception rather than the rule").
61 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Despite the
Court's constant admonition that "[s]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
Id.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating it is well-settled that the
exceptions have swallowed the rule.); See also Haddad, supra note 60, at 199 (stating that
"[o]nly through a disingenuous use of multiple subcategories can distinct varieties of valid
warrantless searches be reduced to few in number."); Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood
Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 786 (1992)
(noting that "[t]oday, such pronouncements from the Court are meaningless").
Among the "specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" are the following:
searches incident to lawful arrests, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-56 (1969);
searches of automobiles, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); searches in
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exception alone, the Court has validated warrantless searches in each of
the four categories mentioned in the Fourth Amendment.6 3
At the same time, the Court has consistently interpreted the

established exceptions broadly, enabling their reach to extend far beyond

exigent circumstances/hot pursuit, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966)
(exigent circumstances); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (hot pursuit); "frisk"
searches, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968); searches at the border (or functional
equivalent), Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973); administrative
searches, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987); searches due to "special needs
beyond law enforcement," O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987); inventory
searches, Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 368 (1987); consent searches, Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); searches of containers in cars, California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565, 575 (1991); searches of motorhomes, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393
(1985); foreign property searches of non-resident aliens, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259, 267 (1990).
Additionally, the Court has "exempted" government action from the Fourth
Amendment by reasoning that the government's conduct was not a "search" within the
meaning of the amendment. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-50 (1989) (police
aerial surveillance of backyard while hovering four hundred feet in helicopter and observing
marijuana plants not a Fourth Amendment "search"); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,
41 (1988) (inspection of trash left at curbside not Fourth Amendment "search"); California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (police surveillance and photography from airplane at
one thousand feet of marijuana in backyard not a Fourth Amendment "search"); Oliver v.
United States, 469 U.S. 843, 853 (1984) (police trespass and examination of private property
open fields not a "search"); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (canine sniffs
of luggage in airport terminal not a "search"); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983)
(police use of flashlight to illuminate inside of automobile not a "search"); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (police use of pen register to record telephone number dialed
not a Fourth Amendment "search").
62 The "special needs" exception was first recognized in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325 (1985), in which the Court noted that "special needs beyond the normal need for law
enforcement" justified suspension of the warrant requirement. Id. at 351. "Special needs"
have since validated warrantless searches in Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Assoc., 489
U.S. 602 (1989) (mandatory drug testing of certain railway crews); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709 (1987) (warrantless search of government employee's office, desk, and file cabinet);
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (warrantless search of probationer's home).
63 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 636 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see id. (warrantless searches
of"persons"); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871 (warrantless searches of"houses"); O'Connor, 480
U.S. at 718 (warrantless searches of "papers"); TL.O., 469 U.S. at 331 (warrantless searches
of "effects").
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the facts and principles upon which they were decided. 64 The Court's
numerous decisions construing the consent-search exception are
illustrative.
The principle case recognizing the well-established exception to
the warrant and probable cause requirements for searches upon consent

remains Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.65 That decision held that when the
government seeks to justify a warrantless search based upon the consent
of the search subject, the government need only demonstrate that
consent was voluntarily given and need not prove that the individual
knew of his right to withhold consent. 66 The Court thus went on to
reverse the Court of Appeals which required the government to prove
knowledge of the right to refuse consent. Emphasizing its decision as
a "narrow one," the Court stressed the fact that the suspect in the case
was not in police custody. 7 It was not long, however, before the
"narrowly" defined exception for noncustodial consent searches was
expanded to include consent by suspects in custody,68 consent by others
than the suspect, though binding on the accused, 69 and amazingly,

See Lewis R. Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expectations, 19 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 557, 560 (1982) (arguing that Warrant Clause exceptions frequently "are permitted
to outrun the ... circumstances which gave rise to their status, extending them far beyond
the limits required to accommodate the legitimate needs which they originally served"); see
also infra note 74 and accompanying text.
65 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
6 Id. at 222-23, 232-33. The Court acknowledged that "knowledge of the right to refuse
[consent] is a factor to be taken into account" in assessing the voluntariness of consent. Id.
at 249.
67 Id. at 248.
61 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (holding that failure to warn suspect of
right to refuse consent was not controlling where suspect was arrested and thus in custody
but consent was given while in street and not in police station). See also United States v.
Smith, 543 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding consent obtained from suspect at police
station).
69
See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (upholding warrantless search
of defendant's home upon voluntary consent of third party possessing "common authority
over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected");
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184-86 (1990) (holding that warrantless search based
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consent to search in one place as construed to mean consent to search in
another.7" The Court's tendency toward stretching the "exceptions"
virtually to their breaking point is not isolated to the consent context.
Just this term, in Marylandv. Wilson,7 the Court held the Pennsylvania
v. Mimms72 rule that police may, as a matter of course, order the driver
of a lawfully stopped automobile to exit the vehicle, applicable to
passengers as well.73 Wilson's expansion of a prior settled exception
marks no innovation in the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.7 4

upon consent of third party whom police reasonably, though erroneously, believed to have
common authority over the premises was valid under the Fourth Amendment).
70 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249, 252 (1991) (holding that general consent to
search automobile for narcotics could reasonably be construed to authorize additional
searches of every closed container found within the vehicle which could conceivably hold
narcotics). Predictably, the Jimeno rule that the scope of a particular consent is determined
by reference to a police officer's objectively reasonable interpretation thereof has been
expansively, if not unrealistically, applied in some lower federal courts. See, e.g., United
States v. Ibarra, 948 F.2d 903, 906-07 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that it was objectively
reasonable for police officers to construe home occupant's consent to search home for
evidence of drug trafficking and money laundering to include consent to search attic by
destroying with sledgehammer boarded barricade thereto.)
7 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
72
434 U.S. 106 (1977).
73 117 S. Ct. at 886.
14 See supra note 61. The Court's practice of extending the reach of Warrant Clause
exceptions is further illustrated by the following decisions: Nat'l Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (administrative search exception extended to permit
suspicionless drug testing of U.S. Custom Service employees); California v. Carney, 471
U.S. 386 (1985) (extending "automobile exception" to motor home parked in a public place);
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (extending "frisk" search exception to permit
warrantless search of passenger compartment of automobile "reasonably believed" to pose
danger); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (search incident to arrest exception
permits search of entire passenger compartment of automobile in which arrestee was seized);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border search exception extended
to warrantless searches at "functional equivalents" of border); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (extending authority to
search as incident to valid arrest to all arrests regardless of whether officer fears danger or
destruction of evidence); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (administrative
search exception extended to "heavily regulated industries"). But see Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969) (narrowing scope of search incident to arrest approved in United States
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Thus this Article's proposal to return to the warrant requirement would
reverse the Court's rapid retreat from the warrant preference view.

C. The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment:
Returning to the Warrant Requirement

In the debate between critics and proponents of the Court's
warrant-requirement reading of the Fourth Amendment, opponents of
the warrant rule have relied upon constitutional text and history to
criticize the warrant rule as not constitutionally mandated." However,
none of the arguments forcefully leads to the conclusion that the warrant
requirement is not constitutionally supportable.7 6

Critics of the warrant requirement rely on the language of the
Amendment because constitutional interpretation naturally begins with
a reading of the text.77 They argue that the warrant rule is not textually
supported because the text does not expressly explain the relationship,

if any, between the reasonableness and Warrant Clause.78 Recognition

v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950)).
75See infra notes 77-78, 85-86 and accompanying text.
76See infra notes 79-80, 87-93 and accompanying text.
7 See JERALD H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 16 (1980) (noting that "the most
important datum bearing on what was intended is the constitutional language itself'); Maclin,
supra note 36, at 208 ("When construing any constitutional provision, the language of the
document is the obvious place to begin the analysis.").
71 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The
Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches or seizures..
.. "); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[N]othing
in the Fourth Amendment itself requires that searches be conducted pursuant to warrants");
Maclin, supra note 36, at 207 ("To be sure, the Fourth Amendment's language does not
require that all searches and seizures be authorized by a warrant.").
Proponents of a warrant requirement generally do not dispute that a literal reading
of the Amendment fails to provide explicit support for the view that warrants are
indispensable to "reasonableness." This concession seems hardly significant. It has been
argued that the drafters did not place great importance on the precise language of the
Amendment. E.g., id. at 208-09 (noting legislative history which reveals original draft of
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framer's silence
of this fact, however, does not resolve the issue. The
79
merely creates the ambiguity, it does not resolve it.
Support for a warrant requirement follows not from a sterile
reading, but an in toto analysis of the Amendment which demonstrates
that an independent reading of the clauses leads to an anomalous result."0
The substantive clause prohibits "unreasonable" searches, while the
procedural clause specifies the elements of a validly issued warrant."'
If the substantive clause is not informed by the procedural clause, it
would make little sense to include the procedural clause in the
Amendment.8 2 After all, the procedural protections would be little more
than superfluous gratuities to be followed at the whim of the government
if the "reasonableness" of the search did not depend on compliance with
the procedural mechanism.8 3 Since "[i]t cannot be presumed that any

Amendment was changed in committee and went unnoticed by either House or Senate).
Thus implying intent from what is not in the text seems unpersuasive.
71See Maclin, supra note 36, at 208 (noting that the failure of the text to explicitly require
warrants for all searches "does not end the matter" as to whether the Amendment should be
so interpreted).
" See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
83 See supra note 2.
82 See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
83 See

LANDYNSKI, supra note 22, at 43-44 (1966). Landynski similarly argued:

[T]he Fourth Amendment made no provision for the warrantless search
any more than it did for the general search warrant ....

It would be

strange, to say.the least, for the amendment to specify stringent warrant
requirements, after having in effect negated these by authorizing
judicially unsupervised "reasonable" searches without warrant. To
detach the first clause from the second is to run the risk of making the
second virtually useless.
Id.But see Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. CT. REV.49,
72 n.56 (1981) (arguing that reading clauses independently does not render Warrant Clause
superfluous because police may choose to obtain warrant when not required in order to
"secure [a]
defense of legal process if sued for torts committed in the course of the search").
Yet given the anti-executive spirit of the framers who lived under oppressive general search
regimes, it is unlikely they intended to draft the Amendment so as to ensure law enforcement
a legal defense to charges brought by aggrieved citizens.
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clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect,"8 4 the
independent reading of the Amendment's clauses must be rejected.
Opponents of the warrant preference view also rely upon the
historical argument that since the drafters were concerned with general
warrants and writs of assistance, their intent was to circumscribe the
issuance of warrants, not require their use. 5 According to this view,
reading the Fourth Amendment as imposing a warrant requirement is
thus inconsistent with the history surrounding the Amendment's drafting
and ratification. 6
The Constitution should not, however, be interpreted on the basis
of history's silence.87 The fact that the Framers were not targeted by
warrantless searches merely creates ambiguity about their attitude
toward them. 8 The drafters' failure to explicitly proscribe searches

4 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).

'5See TELFORD

TAYLOR,

Two
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23, 41

(1969) (arguing that the Framers were concerned with overreaching warrants because
"nothing gave them cause for worry about warrantless searches ... their prime purpose was
to prohibit the oppressive use of warrants"); Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth
Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603, 639 (1982) (arguing that
"common law history provides no evidence of warrantless searches" and therefore the
Framers were unconcerned with them); Arnold Loewy, The FourthAmendment as a Device
for Protectingthe Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1240 (1983) (commenting that since
police based oppressive searches on oppressive warrants, the drafters "felt the need to keep
the issuance of warrants within bounds"); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government
Power, and the FourthAmendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 591 n. 14 (1992) ("The people
who wrote and ratified the Fourth Amendment appear to have been worried about restricting
warrants, not mandating their use.").
86See TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 23 (noting that the warrant requirement is "in dissonance
with the teaching of history"); Posner, supra note 83, at 80 (arguing that the warrant
requirement is "ahistorical").
87See infra note 88.
8

See Ronald J.Bacigal, Dodging A Bullet, But Opening Old Wounds in Fourth

Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 597, 609 (1986) (asserting that the
history of the Fourth Amendment does not resolve the Amendment's ambiguities);
Tomkovicz, supra note 52, at 1136 ("[T]he historical background of the Fourth Amendment
...does not yield an unimpeachable answer regarding the warrant rule.").
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without warrant in the Fourth Amendment thus does not indicate their
approval of such practices.8 9
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that "the evil the
[Fourth] Amendment was designed to prevent was broader than the
abuse of a general warrant."9 ° The evil of the general warrant, with
which the Framers were undoubtedly concerned, was its sanction of
arbitrary and abusive intrusions upon the individual's privacy and
personal liberty. 9' Yet, warrantless searches, were they in practice,
would have been no less oppressive. 92 Given the legitimate concerns of
the Framers, opposition to the warrant preference view must rely on the
remarkable conclusion that the Framers would not have vigorously

opposed warrantless searches, exhibiting the same evils as the general

9 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977) (noting that since "warrantless

searches were not a large issue in colonial America ... silence in the historical record tells
us little"); Amsterdam, supra note 31, at 398 ("The agreement of many minds upon the
decision to disapprove particular practices does not signify the least agreement to approve
other practices not upon the agenda."); Maclin, supra note 36, at 221 (arguing that we should
not "infer from ... history that the Framers and ratifiers had no qualms about other law
enforcement practices not atop the Revolutionary list of grievances during the late 1780s").
90Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980); Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 8-9 (1977)
(noting that Framers intended Amendment not just to protect against "specific abuses which
gave it birth," but "to safeguard fundamental values").
91See Amsterdam, supra note 31, at 411.
92 The arbitrary and oppressive character of the writ of assistance and general warrant
stemmed from the fact that neither required probable cause for issuance. NELSON
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54, 60 (1937) (noting that writs empowered officials to search "at their will
wherever they suspected ... bare suspicion without oath was sufficient" to search under
writs of assistance"); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 379 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(describing historical criticism of warrants lacking probable cause). In addition, neither the
writ of assistance nor the general warrant limited the scope of the search. TAYLOR, supra
note 85, at 23, 30, 40 (general warrants and writs of assistance totally failed to specify
persons or places to be searched); see LANDYNSKI, supra note 22, at 27 (writs of assistance
were objectionable because unlimited discretion granted to customs officials).
Since warrantless searches, likewise, would have lacked these protections, it is clear
that the warrantless search would have been at least as intrusive upon liberty as that
conducted under a general warrant or writ of assistance.
CONSTITUTION,
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warrants and writs of assistance against which they stridently rebelled.9 3
Neither constitutional history nor text justifies dispensing with the
warrant rule which is essential to the central meaning of the Fourth

Amendment-to provide protection from arbitrary and overzealous
government action.94
The warrant requirement is indispensable to the values which the
Fourth Amendment guarantees.95 The Supreme Court has consistently
recognized that warrants seek to avert invasions into personal privacy by
interposing a magistrate between citizens and law enforcement.9 6 By

" See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (noting that
general searches "were one of the matters over which the American Revolution was fought");
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 159 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating that
the Fourth Amendment sought to prevent abuse that "more than any one single factor gave
rise to American independence").
As one scholar as pointed out, "[tihe problem with the [anti-warrant view] is its
extremely restrictive and unsatisfying perspective on the use of history in constitutional
interpretation. By tying the Fourth Amendment to specific practices of a bygone era, this
narrow historical reasoning runs the risk of thwarting the Framer's more general goals."
Tomkovicz, supra note 52, at 1136-37.
9' See cases cited supra note 17.
9' It was long ago recognized that "[t]he bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection...
is the Warrant Clause." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978).
' See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) in which Justice Jackson gave
this classic explanation:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any
assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the
officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the
Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure in the
discretion of police officers. .

.

. The right of officers to thrust

themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the
individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
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requiring a neutral and detached magistrate's 97 ex ante review of the
evidence, the warrant "represents an independent and unbiased
assurance" that searches will not proceed unjustified. 98 The warrant
therefore does not merely redress privacy intrusions once suffered, but
rather prevents such violations from occurring at all. 99
Moreover, ex ante review avoids the danger that the impartiality

of a subsequent evaluation will be compromised by the evidence
uncovered during the search in question.' ° In addition, the warrant
requirement informs the search target of the legality of the search 0 ' and
thus may provide protection from harm to the government's searching
agent.'0 2 Since the warrant "establish[es] the searching officer's

judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
Id.; see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (explaining the primary
purposes of the warrant requirement).
" Phrases such as "magistrate" and "judicial officer" are intended to be synonymous. The
Supreme Court has recognized that there is no significance to the variance in terminology.
See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 349 (1972).
98 POLYVIOU, supra note 23, at 94; see also Phyllis T. Bookspan, Jar Wars: Employee
Drug Testing, The Constitution, and the American Drug Problem, 26 AM. CRiM. L. REv.
359, 373 n.80 (1988) ("The warrant requirement ensures that a neutral officer will judge
whether a search is justified." The warrant is thus necessary because "officials in the heat
of an investigation may take inadequate account of the privacy rights of their targets.").
" See Robert Angell, California v. Acevedo and the Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21
CAP. U. L. REv. 707, 719 (1992) ("[T]he warrant requirement may prevent unreasonable
invasions of privacy that might occur upon a policeman's mistaken determination of probable
cause.").
"oSee United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976) (noting that warrants
"prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search"); see also
Angell, supra note 99, at 721 ("[Slince the warrant is issued prior to [the] search ... it
protects against the possibility that the search might be justified post hoc by what it turns
up."); Stuntz, supra note 56, at 910 (recognizing that "[i]t must be hard for ajudge to decide
that an officer had less than probable cause to believe cocaine was in the trunk of a
defendant's car when the cocaine was in fact there").
"01See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (noting that warrants inform
search targets of the scope and legality of the search); see also Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S.
at 565 (noting that warrants provide "assurance" to search targets).
12 See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
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authority"'0 3 the officer is less likely to be met by the defense tactics of
a property owner or search subject during the warrant's execution." 4
The crucial role of search warrants in the Fourth Amendment scheme
supports strict adherence to their use and compelling reasons for
dispensing with their protections."' Despite this principle, the Court's
recent employment of the "general reasonableness" approach has
substantially minimized the protections provided by the warrant
requirement.

II. The "General Reasonableness" Approach
and the Inadequacies of Balancing
Analytically, the Court has eroded the warrant requirement by
employing a comparison of interests approach which entails "balancing

Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 565.
WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 155-56 (1985)
(arguing that the ordinary requirement that police "give notice of their authority and purpose
prior to making an entry of premises ... reduces the potential for violence to both the police
officers and the occupants").
05 See Maclin, supra note 36, at 202 ("At a minimum, the Fourth Amendment commands
compelling reasons, or at least a substantial justification, before a warrantless search or
seizure is declared reasonable."); see also infra Part IV.B.
Critics have attacked a warrant requirement on the basis that reviewing magistrates are
mere "rubber stamps" for police suspicions. Eg., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Forward: The Flow
and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO.
L.J. 151, 196 (1980) ("[S]ome magistrates become rubber stamps for the police"); William
A. Schroeder, DeterringFourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary
Rule, 69 GEO.L.J. 1361, 1412 (1981) ("[C]onsiderable evidence indicates that some
magistrates become rubber stamps for the police").
The debate has not been settled. See ALBERT R. BEISEL, JR., CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL
'o

'4oSee

ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 28 (1955) (noting that

available evidence suggests that a search warrant is an effective means of serving purpose
of preventing searches and seizures without justification; there is not a hint that the warrant
process is actually "a needless formality"); Tomkovicz, supra note 52, at 1150 ("[T]here is
certainly not a sufficient empirical foundation for a confident conclusion" that magistrates
are mere rubber stamps.).
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the need to search against the invasion which the search entails."' 6 In
contrast to the traditional focus on the Amendment's Warrant Clause," 7
the balancing method focuses primarily on the "reasonableness" clause0 .
and takes no account of the traditional presumption against validating
warrantless searches. 0 9 This recent movement toward balancing Fourth
Amendment "interests""' has both operated as a death knell for the

v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S.
325, 331 (1990) (upholding warrantless "protective sweep" of home upon in-house arrest by
balancing "the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests"); see, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989) (upholding mandatory drug testing of certain
railway crews by balancing government interest in deterring drug use by "employees
engaged in safety sensitive tasks" against individual privacy interests); Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (upholding suspicionless drug
testing of certain Customs Service employees by balancing government interest in deterring
drug use among those tested against individual privacy interests); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709, 724-25 (1987) (holding that government interest in "ensuring that . . .
[governmental] agencies operate in an effective and efficient manner" outweighs
"constitutionally protected privacy interest of government employees..
"oT See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
08 See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 420 (1996) (observing that "the
'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness"') (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500
U.S. 248, 250 (1991)); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65, 66 (1950) ("[W]e
cannot agree that this [the warrant] requirement should be crystallized into a sine qua non
to the reasonableness of a search .... The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant but whether the search was reasonable.").
"o9See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (applying balancing approach "without reference to our
usual presumption in favor of the procedures specified in the Warrant clause"). In fact, the
absence of the presumption against warrantless searches is the key ingredient distinguishing
the balancing model from the theoretical per se rule of invalidity. Id.
"' See Buie, 494 U.S. at 331 (upholding warrantless "protective sweep" of home upon
in-house arrest by balancing "the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests."); Fritzler, supra note 33, at 474
("In recent years ... the Court has all but abandoned ... bright line rules and has resorted
more often to a flexible 'balancing' approach in which the 'reasonableness' term of the Fourth
Amendment reigns."); Wasserstrom, supra note 33, at 121 ("The Court's turn away from the
specific commands of the Warrant Clause and toward a balancing test of general
reasonableness is now evident."). But cf Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (employing
bright line rule in holding that movement of object to inspect what is not in plain view
06 Camara
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warrant preference view and substantially weakened Fourth Amendment
protections."' As a method of constitutional adjudication in the Fourth
Amendment context, the Court's current method of interest balancing
should be abandoned." 2 Despite the stature of the Fourth Amendment

in the Bill of Rights," 3 the Court's general reasonableness interpretation,
in which warrantless searches are examined by balancing competing

"interests," fails to accord Fourth Amendment "rights" adequate
protection." 4 The Court's balancing methodology fails to account for the

constitutes Fourth Amendment search).
...
See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 3 1, at 31 ("[Tlhe result of th[e] movement
[toward general reasonableness] has been, for the most part, a steady weakening of fourth
amendment protections."); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance:
Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1173, 1180, 1194 nn.27, 98 (1988) ("[The current reasonableness test] generally
works to validate searches and seizures which would be held unconstitutional under the
conventional interpretation ....[Iun the Fourth Amendment context, the Court's balancing
holdings have restricted rather than expanded individual rights."); Laura A. Lundquist,
Weighing the Factors of Drug Testingfor FourthAmendment Balancing, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1151, 1156 (1992) (remarking that "the Court's exceptions to the warrant and
probable cause requirements, along with its balancing analysis, have increased the
government's power to search and seize").
The Court's decisions in cases utilizing the balancing test have lessened the protection
traditionally recognized by the Amendment. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 604-06 and Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 665 (noting that individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is not a necessary
element of "reasonableness" under the Fourth Amendment).
'12For a discussion of the proposal urged by this Article, see infra Parts IV.A-C.
..The Court has recognized that Fourth Amendment liberties "[represent] one of th[ose]
unique values of our civilization," McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948);
and '[are] the very essence of constitutional liberty."' Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145,
150 (1947) (quoting Gouled v. United States, 225 U.S. 298, 304 (1921)), overruled by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 121
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that the "Fourth Amendment is indispensable to
preserving the liberties of a democratic society"); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[Fourth Amendment rights] are not mere second-class
rights but belong in the class of indispensable freedoms.").
".. See Maclin, supra note 36, at 213 (arguing that the Court's deferential general
reasonableness approach "offer[s] only minimal judicial oversight" and "is at odds with the
central purpose of the Fourth Amendment which is distrust of discretionary police power");
Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right By DisregardingDoctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriquez
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difference between a "right" guaranteed by the Constitution and an
individual or government's mere "interest" in achieving a particular
goal." 5' The Court's approach thus misconstrues a fundamental notion

of constitutional supremacy in which constitutionalized values supersede

Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the
Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 52-53 (1991). Professor Davies wrote:
A generalized reasonableness reading allows for a flexible, colloquial
interpretation of 'reasonableness' under which any police conduct that
is 'understandable' in the circumstances according to common sense
should be judged 'reasonable' for purposes of assessing the
constitutionality of police intrusions. In effect, this reading treats the
Fourth Amendment more as a 'regulatory canon' than as a statement of
a citizen's enforceable right.
Id.
15See RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 269 (1977) (arguing that treating
rights guaranteed by the Constitution as "interests" which can be overcome by other
"interests" overlooks the meaning of the word "right"); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 988 (1987) (noting that in
balancing cases, "the Constitution is viewed as a broom closet in which constitutional
interests are stored and taken out when appropriate to be considered with other social
values"). Criticizing balancing, Professor Aleinikoff wrote:
If each constitutional provision, every constitutional value, is
understood simply as an invitation for a discussion of good social
policy, it means little to talk of constitutional 'theory.' Ultimately, the
notion of constitutional supremacy [is defeated]. For under a regime of
balancing, a constitutional judgment no longer looks like a trump. It
seems merely to be a card of a higher value in the same suit.
Id. at 990.
However, under the Court's Fourth Amendment balance, the constitutional card
is not even deemed a greater value than the government interest card. The balance begins
on even tilt. See supra note 109.
The weakness of the Court's balance perhaps lies in the very existence of a
constitution. If constitutional values were to be given no greater force than any other value
in a struggle between them, then denominating some values as "constitutional principles"
and others as "interests" would be little more than a futile exercise in semantics. The very
existence of the Constitution belies any conclusion that the principles contained therein are
on even par with those which were left out. See Aleinikoff, supra note 115, at 990.
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nonconstitutionalized values as a matter of law." 6 Relegating Fourth

Amendment rights to mere

"interests" to be vanquished by

countervailing government "interests," however inconsistent with
constitutional theory, marks no departure from the Court's usual hostile
approach to the Fourth Amendment." 7
The Court's treatment of warrantless searches under the present
balancing methodology provides little more than deference to law
enforcement decisions to circumvent the warrant process." ' The test of
"reasonableness" is, in fact, no more stringent than the mere rationality
standard" 9 applied to legislative classifications in the equal protection
context. 2 ° Such acquiescent "low level" review 2 ' of government action

116

See Aleinikoff, supra note 115, at 992 (articulating principle of constitutional

supremacy pursuant to which constitutional principles should defeat non-constitutional
principles).
7
1 See HELLMAN, supra note 5, at 161 (noting that "in an alarming number of cases the
courts seem to bend over backwards to sustain police conduct that even in the most favorable
light stretches the Fourth Amendment to the breaking point"); Alschuler, supra note 31, at
241 (1984) ("It may not be entirely coincidental that most of the Supreme Court's current
bright line rules tell police officers, 'Yes, you may search,' rather than, 'No you may not."');
see also Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886-87 (1997) (balancing competing interests
and opting for bright line rule that police may routinely order passengers from lawfully
stopped vehicles without any individualized suspicion whatsoever); California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565 (1991) (opting for bright line rule, Court overruled "container doctrine" which
required warrants to precede search of closed containers found in automobile where probable
cause extended only to the container and not the vehicle, in favor of rule permitting
warrantless searches of all containers in cars).
..See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989)
(refusing to "second-guess" conclusion of Federal Railroad Administration that warrantless
drug and alcohol testing of certain railroad employees was least intrusive means of achieving
safety on railroad); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 434 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring)
(noting that "a realistic court seldom should second-guess the good-faith judgment of the
officer in the field").
..
9See supra note 34.
"0See Maclin, supra note 36, at 221 ("Rather than require that government officials meet
the same heightened constitutional standard as in the context of other preferred rights, the
Court employs a rational basis test offering only minimal judicial oversight."); Nadine
Strossen, Michigan Dep't. of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to Meaningful Judicial
Enforcement of ConstitutionalRights, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 288 (1991) ("The Court now
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is contrary to the core value of the Fourth Amendment--distrust of
police power.'
While the judiciary arguably owes a degree of
deference to decisions made by coordinate branches of the government,
the rationale for deference in that context is inapplicable to the hurried
decisions of officers "acting under the excitement that attends the
capture of persons accused of crime." '23
The minimal scrutiny of law enforcement decisions to proceed
without a warrant, moreover is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
constitutional role as guardian of individual liberties.'24 Precisely

has abdicated meaningful judicial review of government measures that abridge the personal
liberties protected by specific Bill of Rights guarantees, much as it previously [did in the
Equal Protection context].").
2' "Low level" review is synonymous with "rational basis" review under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See STONE, ET AL., supra note 13, at 533 (equating
"low level" and "rational basis" review).
22
1 See Maclin, supra note 36, at 201 (observing that the "central
meaning of the Fourth
Amendment is distrust of police power and discretion"); see also cases cited supra note 17
and accompanying text.
23United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
124 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) (identifying the Court's "traditional
responsibility to guard against police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or which
trenches upon personal security without . . . justification"); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (recognizing that "[t]he needs of law enforcement stand in
constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises
of official power. It is precisely . . . these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to
constitutional safeguards.").
A crucial element of the Supreme Court's role in the constitutional structure is to
provide protection, free of the constraints of political passions, to individual rights and
liberties that may become threatened over time. See BICKEL, supra note 13, at 23-28 (1962):
Courts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of principle that
legislatures and executives do not possess. Judges have, or should have,
the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the
scholar in pursuing the ends of government. This is crucial in sorting
out the enduring values of society. [Their] insulation and the marvelous
mystery of time give courts the capacity to appeal to men's better
natures, to call forth their aspirations, which they may have forgotten in
the moment's hue and cry.
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because the typical Fourth Amendment search case involves a defendant
charged with a crime,' 25 the Court should zealously scrutinize the law
26
enforcement methods employed to obtain the government's evidence.1
It is the politically unpopular whose liberties are most at risk.'27
Besides providing only minimal protection of Fourth
Amendment rights, the amorphous character 2 ' of the Court's present

2 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting

that "the strongest advocates of Fourth Amendment rights are frequently criminals"); United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he safeguards
of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.");
Strossen, supra note I 11, at 1190 (noting that Fourth Amendment rights are most often
examined in criminal cases where a defendant has been charged with a crime).
26 See infra note 127.
.27
See Strossen, supra note I 1l, at 1190 (noting that those accused of crime "are unlikely
to be looked upon with great sympathy"). In this view, the Court would be performing a
function analogous to its "representation-reinforcement" role. See ELY, supra note 77, at 88104 (1980) (discussing Court's role of providing relief to those minorities disfavored in the
political process or those for whom the political process has "broken down"); BICKEL, supra
note 13, at 23-28 (discussing Court's role as protector of constitutional rights which are not
recognized in the political process). Justice Douglas criticized the Court's failure to
stringently protect those accused of crime and recognized the inherent danger:
Decisions under the Fourth Amendment . . . have not given the
protection to the citizen which the letter and spirit of the Amendment
would seem to require. One reason, I think, is that wherever a culprit is
caught red-handed, as in leading Fourth Amendment cases, it is difficult
to adopt and enforce a rule that would turn him loose. A rule protective
of law-abiding citizens is not apt to flourish where its advocates are
usually criminals. Yet the rule we fashion isfor the innocent and guilty
alike. (Emphasis added).
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
28 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 637 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's balancing test "lies virtually devoid of meaning,
subject to whatever content shifting judicial majorities, concerned about the problems of the
day, choose to give to th[e] [reasonableness] term"); Michael S. Vaughn & Rolando V. del
Carmen, "Special Needs" in Criminal Justice: An Evolving Exception to the Fourth
Amendment Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements, 3 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J.
203, 223 (1993) ("The... balancing test.., can theoretically legitimize any governmental
searches 'to the point where they pose a very real threat for the privacy interests of the
innocent."') (citation omitted).
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balancing approach can be criticized for its failure to provide guidance
to law enforcement'2 9 and because its highly value-dependent and factspecific nature produces decisions with little reliable precedential
value. 3 ' Although the Amendment's "reasonableness" language admits
of no simple definitional solution,' the Court's current balancing of
interests is neither necessary, 32 nor the most desirable method for
adjudicating the conflict between individual rights and government
interests, even where the governing standard of behavior is incapable of
precise definition.'33 For instance, the Court has not resorted to an ad
hoc balancing approach to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal

Protection Clause despite the fact that "equality" is not subject to
definitional precision.' 34 Rather, the Court has developed varying
standards which examine the end sought to be achieved, the means of
achieving the desired end, and the relationship between the means and

'29
The Supreme Court is not unaware of the lack of guidance provided by its current
balancing test. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-82 (1984) (reaffirming bright
line rule that searches of open fields are not subject to the warrant requirement, the Court
noted "[t]he ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman to discern the
scope of his authority but it would also create the danger that constitutional rights would be
arbitrarily and inequitably enforced"); supranote 32; see also Sundby, supra note 31, at 427
(1988) ("The Court's general invocation of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness language
not only provides little meaningful guidance, it begs the question of what reasonableness
should mean for the Amendment's purposes.").
30
"'
See Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV.
673, 737-38 (1963) (noting that the balancing approach "takes little from the past and offers
less for the future; each [decision] is a law unto itself").
131See Sundby, supra note 31, at 427 ("The very notion of reasonableness suggests a
concept incapable of specific definition ....
").Appealing to the reasonableness language
of the Amendment, the Court has attempted to justify its balancing approach noting that
"very little that has been said in our previous decisions and very little that we might say here
can usefully refine the language of the Amendment itself in order to evolve some detailed
formula for judging cases .... Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973) (citations
omitted).
132See infra Parts Ill, IV.
131
See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
34At least one scholar has previously made this observation. See Sundby, supra note 31,
at 430; see also cases cited infra note 135 and accompanying text.

562

N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XIII

the end contemplated by the government.'35 A similar approach should
be adopted in the context of Fourth Amendment warrantless searches.

III. Strict Scrutiny of Warrantless Searches:

The "Fundamental"Nature of Fourth Amendment Rights
Fourth Amendment rights are unquestionably fundamental.' 36
Yet unlike judicial review of other "fundamental rights,"'37 the Fourth
Amendment's protections have not been closely scrutinized by the
Court. 3 This inconsistency in constitutional interpretation both fails to

'"See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (applying rational basis
review requires that classification be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest"); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191 (1976) (applying "middle tier" review to gender classification
which must serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to
achieving those objectives"); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457 (1988)
(strict scrutiny applies to "suspect classifications" and burdens on "fundamental rights;" state
must prove action is "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest").
36 The Supreme Court defined a "fundamental right" in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78, 102 (1908) as "an immutable principle of'justice... a fundamental principle of liberty
and justice which inheres in the very idea of a free government and is the inalienable right
of a citizen of such a government." Id. Likewise, a right is fundamental which is "of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937). The Court has deemed the Fourth Amendment a "fundamental" right for purposes
of incorporating its guarantees into the "Due Process" Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Cf.Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 121 (1980)
(Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing the "Fourth Amendment is indispensable to preserving the
liberties of a democratic society").
Commentators, likewise, have recognized the fundamental nature of Fourth Amendment
rights. E.g., Maclin, supra note 36, at 230 ("Even the most ardent foe of a broad
interpretation of civil liberties is hard pressed to deny that the Fourth Amendment ranks as
a fundamental right deserving strict judicial scrutiny).
"' For purposes of applying "strict scrutiny" under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, the Court has deemed other rights "fundamental." E.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (right to travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30
(1968) (right to vote and right to associate).
131 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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recognize the Fourth Amendment's essential role in a free society 139 and
needlessly complicates constitutional adjudication. 4 '

Protection from police overreaching is not merely on an equal
plane with other essential values of a democratic society, it underlies
those values and provides the security necessary to the exercise of other
fundamental rights. 1 ' Adopting strict scrutiny in the context of Fourth
Amendment warrantless searches would be consistent with the Court's
approach to other fundamental rights including the First Amendment.'4 2

139See Maclin, supra note 61, at 731 n.25. Professor Maclin wrote:

One cannot ...imagine a free society without some protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. By definition, a society that permits
its police to search or arrest whenever or whomever they please is not
a free society. The Fourth Amendment, therefore, should be viewed
along with a few other safeguards, such as the First Amendment's
protection of political speech, as a bulwark of civil liberty and of
freedom itself.
Id; see also LaFave, supra note 31, at 308 ("[T]he protections of the Fourth Amendment are
exceedingly important'... largely determining, as they do, 'the kind of society in which we
live."') (citation omitted); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Fourth Amendment occupies "a place second to none in the Bill
of Rights").
141 See infra note 153 and accompanying
text.
141See Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, in
POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 87, 97 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962):
The basic ...problem of a free society is the problem of controlling the
public monopoly of force. All the other freedoms, freedom of speech,
of assembly, of religion, of political action, pre-suppose that arbitrary
and capricious police action has been restrained. Security in one's home
and person is the fundamental without which there can be no liberty.
ld; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 121 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Fourth Amendment is indispensable to preserving the liberties of a democratic society");
cases cited infra notes 146-47.
42 The Court has often applied heightened scrutiny to government burdens on
"fundamental rights." See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390-94 (1992) (symbolic
speech); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199-200 (1992) (political speech); Simon &
Schuster, Inc v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991)
(free speech); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 565-66
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting that strict scrutiny
has been applied to burdens of the right to practice religion); Clark v. Jetter, 486 U.S. 456,
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First Amendment rights 43 have long received heightened judicial
attention because they form "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom."' Yet, Fourth Amendment rights,
no less than First Amendment rights, form that "indispensable condition"
necessary to the enjoyment of other freedoms. Recognition of our
colonial history indisputably demonstrates that "[t]he use by government
of the power of search and seizure as an adjunct to a system for the
suppression of objectionable publications is not new."'4' The Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that "unrestricted power of search and
146
seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression."'
In short, the First Amendment freedom to possess, print and
purchase materials would mean little if the government could search for
and seize those same items without complying with the Fourth

461 (1988) ("Classifications affecting fundamental rights ... are given the most exacting
scrutiny."); Waller v. Georgia, 407 U.S. 39 (1984) (public access to criminal proceedings);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny to burden on
fundamental right to travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (strict scrutiny
applies to burdens on fundamental rights to vote and associate).
143 The First Amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
14 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
"' Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484 (1965) (quoting Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367
U.S. 717, 724 (1961)).
146 Id.. (quoting Marcus, 367 U.S. at 729); see Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S.
496 (1973)
(holding that seizure of film, which was currently being shown to the public, without a
constitutionally sufficient warrant, was an unreasonable prior restraint under the Fourth
Amendment); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) (invalidating "general warrant" which
authorized seizure of broad categories of items pertaining to the state Communist Party); see
also Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 472 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Fourth Amendment is intimately linked to First Amendment and stating that "in enforcing
the Fourth Amendment's command, court's must exercise a 'scrupulous exactitude' to ensure
that official use of the power to search and seize poses no threat to the liberty of
expression").
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Amendment requirements of probable cause and a warrant. 4 7 Yet the

Court requires the limits on First Amendment rights to be "reasonably
necessaryto achieve the state's compelling interest,"'48 and imposes a

least restrictive alternative requirement upon the government in
pursuance of its compelling interest. 4 9 Neither of these analytic tests are

imposed in the Fourth Amendment context. 5 °
Thus despite the close scrutiny with which the Court examines

burdens on First Amendment rights, Fourth Amendment rights have
received less judicial attention.' 5 ' Applying strict scrutiny standards in
the Fourth Amendment warrantless search context would largely
eliminate this constitutional anomaly 52 and provide a more coherent
model for adjudicating preferred constitutional freedoms.' 53
"' See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 762 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting
that "prevalent" electronic surveillance would violate Fourth Amendment because it "kills
free discourse and spontaneous utterances"); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 163
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment is central to the
enjoyment of other rights such as free speech); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717,
724-29 (1961) (pointing out how free speech and press historically related to police power
to search and noting that "unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an
instrument for stifling liberty of expression").
14&

R.A. V.,
505 U.S. at 395-96.

149Shelton

v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("[E]ven though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.").
5 See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985) (noting that in the
Fourth Amendment context, "the fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract,
have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does not, itself, render the search
unreasonable").
' See Daniel L. Rotenberg, On Seizures and Searches, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 323, 340
(1995) (observing that "a quick comparison between Fourth and First Amendment
procedural protections reveals that the Fourth Amendment is not in the same league as the
First Amendment").
52See Strossen, supra note 11, at 1241 (noting that "[a] sound argument can be made
that Fourth Amendment rights should be entitled to the same degree ofjudicial protection
as First Amendment rights.").
' Under current law, a "fundamental right" analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause will be subjected to strict scrutiny. Government burdens on the
right must be "necessary" to the accomplishment of a "compelling government interest."
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IV. Implementing Strict Scrutiny
in the Fourth Amendment Context
If adopted, the proposed strict scrutiny model would require the
government to prove that a warrantless search was necessary'54 to the
achievement of a compelling government interest 55 and was the least

intrusive alternative reasonably available.' 56 Strict scrutiny would thus
ensure that the warrant process provided a meaningful safeguard to
liberty'5 7 while not unduly hindering legitimate government needs to

search without a warrant in exigent circumstances.'58

See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 390-93; Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992);
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 446 (1991). However, a "fundamental right" analyzed
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause will provide protection against state
governments (as opposed to merely the federal government) but will not necessarily receive
from the Court the heightened regard of strict scrutiny review. Thus, under the current law,
the degree of appropriate government interference with a "fundamental right" depends not
on the values underlying the liberty as much as the clause exalted by the reviewing court.
Such a scheme of constitutional review perversely elevates the source of a right over its
substantive value. See Roy G. Spece, Justifying Invigorated Scrutiny and the Least
Restrictive Alternative as a Superior Form of Intermediate Review: Civil Commitment and
the Right to Treatment as a Case Study, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1049, 1060-67 (1979) (arguing that
"in determining the appropriate standard ofjudicial review, the nature and importance of the
right is of central significance, and is often dispositive").
""'
The "necessity" prong of the proposed model includes two elements: (I) present
inability to obtain a warrant; and (2) careful circumscription of the scope of a search. See
infra Part Iv.A.
See infra Part 1V.B.
56
' See infra Part IV.C.
.57
See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
15 Strict scrutiny would not operate as a death knell to warrantless searches. The
proposed model would permit the government to show that a compelling need for imminent
action justified circumvention of the warrant process. The proposed strict scrutiny model
would thus resemble the current "exigent circumstances" doctrine at least in so far as
requiring the government to show an immediate need to act without a warrant. See, e.g.,
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1977) (holding burning building and its immediate
aftermath presents sufficient exigency to permit warrantless entry); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966) (upholding warrantless extraction of blood from drunk-driving suspect
reasoning that evidence would dissipate while officer obtained warrant). Cf McDonald v.
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A. Necessity and Scope-Limitations
on Warrantless Searches
i. Necessity
Under the proposed standard, warrantless governmental searches
would be presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'59
In order to rebut this presumption, the government would have to prove,
inter alia, 6 ° that resorting to the warrant process was not reasonably
possible given the exigencies of the situation 16 ' and that the scope of the
warrantless search undertaken was "strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies which justif[ied] its initiation."'' 62
The "necessity"

United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (holding that warrantless search reasonable where
"the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative"). To the extent that the
"exigent circumstance" doctrine permits a warrantless search upon a mere showing of time
exigency, however, it differs significantly from the proposed strict scrutiny model which
would require the additional showing that the police were pursuing an unrelated compelling
state interest. See infra Part IV.B.
'9 In this regard, the proposed strict scrutiny model would resemble the current
theoretical rule that "[s]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967)) (citation omitted).
160 The required showing discussed under the "necessary means" and "least intrusive
alternative" components of the strict scrutiny model are in additionto those required under
the "compelling interest" prong. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56. A discussion
of the appropriate standard of proof is beyond the scope of this Article.
161This requirement reflects current law. Under the "exigent circumstances" exception
to the warrant requirement, the government must show that the "exigencies of the situation
made that course imperative." Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298
(1967) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). The "necessity"
requirement under the proposed model would not be satisfied where the police action was
deliberately designed to create an exigency and thereby circumvent the warrant requirement.
See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 45, 48-49 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that exigent circumstances which are "solely a product of police conduct" designed
to circumvent the warrant requirement do not justify proceeding without a warrant).
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requirement is largely reflected in the Court's "exigent circumstances"
jurisprudence and does not represent a significant departure from current

law. 163
In Schmerber v. California,164 for instance, the petitioner was
arrested after an automobile accident in which he and a passenger were
injured, and charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol.1 65
While providing treatment, a hospital physician, over the suspect's
objection, withdrew a blood sample from the petitioner's body at the
direction of a police officer. 6 6 The blood analysis report was
introduced, over objection, against the petitioner at trial and he was
convicted.' 67 Upholding the blood extraction, 68 the Court reasoned that
because the level of alcohol in the blood naturally begins to decline soon
after drinking has stopped, the delay incident to obtaining a search
warrant may reasonably have "threatened the destruction of evidence."' 69
Due to the evanescent nature of the blood/alcohol evidence, it could not
simply be seized or recovered at a later time. Thus, the Court noted that
legitimate time constraints actually created the "necessity" to proceed
without a warrant, 170 and therefore, the police were justified in
7
proceeding without a warrant.1 1

'62
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978); see infra text accompanying notes 17383.

63 See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (holding that a burning building and
its immediate aftermath create exigent circumstances); Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (noting that grave danger to human life creates exigent
circumstances).
'6 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
165Id. at 758.
166 Id.
167 id.
16' As a threshold matter, the Court noted that the blood extraction was plainly a "search"
within the meaning of the Amendment. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
169 Id. at 770-71 (citation omitted).
7 Id. at 771 (noting that "there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a

warrant").
'"' Id. at 770.
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While the Court's "necessity" discussion is consistent with the
proposed model, in the absence of an additional showing of a
compelling state interest, unrelated to the time exigency, Schmerber
would be decided differently under strict scrutiny.

ii. Scope
In addition to proving "necessity," however, strict scrutiny also
would require the government to demonstrate that the scope of the

search was "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation."' 72 Such a requirement would ensure that legitimate privacy
expectations are neither unnecessarily breached nor threatened by
benign public safety rationales.'7 3
In Michigan v. Tyler,'74 the Court explicitly established that a

warrantless search under exigent circumstances must be narrowly
tailored to meet the emergency at hand.'75 Tyler held that a burning
building and its immediate aftermath present exigent circumstances
sufficient to justify a warrantless entry by fire officials.'7 6 The limited

right to enter without a warrant, however, lasts only while the flames are

72

Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,26 (1968)); see

POLYVIOU, supra note 23, at 197 (noting that "'[t]he emergency exception does not give (the
police) carte blanche to rummage for evidence' over and above what is necessary in order to
meet the particular emergency") (footnote omitted).
' See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)
("Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
government's purpose is beneficent."). A warrantless search ostensibly for the benign
purpose of public safety may quickly become a criminal investigation in which the search
becomes directed toward finding evidence for a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Michigan
v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (initial warrantless entry to quell flames in a burning building
soon became a search for evidence of arson).
174436 U.S. 499 (1978).
'"Id.at 511.
116
Id.at 509.
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being quelled and for a reasonable time thereafter,'77 for it is only during
this time that an exigency exists. 178 Any subsequent entry or search,
once the emergency has passed, must be by a search warrant in order to
be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 79 Thus the principle,
proposed by the strict scrutiny model, that the scope of a search is a

necessary element of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, has received
explicit support from the Supreme Court.
Strictly scrutinizing the scope of warrantless searches serves the
values inherent in the particularity requirement of the Warrant Clause.' 0
Such scrutiny would prevent validation of a warrantless search where the
government is able to justify its decision to search without a warrant by
proving it was necessary to the achievement of a compelling interest, but

failed to carefully circumscribe the search once undertaken.' 8 ' Because
securing privacy from arbitrary government power is the central
meaning of the Fourth Amendment,'82 close scrutiny of the breadth of
warrantless searches is essential to vindicate Fourth Amendment
values.83

177Id. at 511.
178Id.

'79 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511; see POLYVIOU, supra note 23, at 199 (discussing exigent
circumstances exception to warrant requirement and noting that "if the emergency has come
to an end, a warrant must be obtained before the authorities can continue with their search").
i'The Warrant Clause states, "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
...
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) (noting that "a search which is reasonable at
its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and
scope").
82
"'
See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police is at the core of the Fourth Amendment."); see also cases
cited supra note 17.
83 Cf.Strossen, supra note 11I, at 1212 (noting that Fourth Amendment rights deserve
"the heightened protection afforded by invigorated judicial scrutiny").
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B. Compelling Government Interests
In addition to requiring "necessity" and a proper limitation on
scope," 4 the second element of the proposed model would require a
"compelling" government interest to justify searching without a
warrant.18 5
The compelling interest test would shield Fourth
Amendment liberties from gradual depreciation by competing, but
constitutionally less significant, government goals.8 6 It thus would
recognize the fundamental distinction between "rights" and "interests"
in constitutional adjudication.' 7
The sufficiency of an asserted
interest
is
an
essential
element of determining
government
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and has been implicitly
considered by a few of the Court's decisions. 8 8 The Court's decision in
Winston v. Lee" 9 is illustrative.
In Lee, the defendant, an attempted robbery suspect, was
allegedly shot by a shop owner during the course of an alleged robbery.
Shortly thereafter, police found the defendant eight blocks from the
shooting, suffering from a gunshot wound in the left chest.' 90 At the
hospital, where both the shop-owner and defendant were brought for
treatment, the shop-owner identified the defendant as the assailant.
Thereafter, the defendant was arrested for attempted robbery and related
offenses.' 9 ' Both a medical expert and X-rays confirmed the presence
of a bullet in the defendant's chest. 92 Following the arrest, the
184See supra Part

IV.A.

infra text accompanying notes 186-240.
116 See DWORKIN, supra note 115, at 191-92, 200 (discussing nature of constitutional

185See

rights or rights in the "strong sense" and arguing that the government cannot override such
rights by exalting a mere societal benefit but must clearly demonstrate a compelling societal
benefit).
87 For a discussion of this distinction and a related criticism of the current balancing
method, see supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 189-203 and accompanying text.
189470 U.S. 753 (1985).
90
1 Id. at 756.
]91 Id.
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Commonwealth of Virginia sought to compel the defendant to submit to
a surgical procedure in order to extract the bullet from his chest.'93 After
numerous decisions by state and federal courts,'94 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that despite the existence of probable cause, extraction of a
bullet from the defendant's chest for use at trial, where there was other
available evidence of the defendant's involvement, was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.' 95 In light of the Commonwealth's
substantial independent evidence of the origin of the bullet, the Court
noted that the government's "assertions of a compelling need for the
bullet are hardly persuasive."'' 96
Similarly, in Tennessee v. Garner'97 the Court held that shooting
and killing fleeing non-violent suspects was too great an intrusion to be
justified by the state's interest in enforcing the criminal law.'98 The
Court was careful to note, however, that where there is probable cause
to believe that a fleeing suspect "poses a threat of serious physical
harm,""' deadly force may be used if necessary.2"' Garner thus
implicitly focused on the sufficiency of the government's asserted
interest, for whether the suspect is dangerous or not, both the means of
the seizure and its intrusiveness are equal in each instance.2 ' When a
fleeing suspect is not a danger to police or the community, the state's

'92

Id. at 756-57.
at 756.

19 Id.

' The procedural history of the case is described at 470 U.S. at 757-58.

Id. at 765-66.
765.
197471 U.S. 1 (1985).
98Id. at 11-12. The Court reasoned that the state's interest in effective law enforcement
was minimal in this context because killing nonviolent suspects was "a self-defeating way
of apprehending a suspect and so setting the criminal justice mechanism in motion." Id. at
9-10.
99 Id. at 11.
'9'

196Id. at

200Id.
201 In

either case, the seizure is effected by a shooting, and a suspect's interest in his own

life simply does not become less by virtue of his dangerousness. See id. at 9 ("The suspect's
fundamental interest in his own life need not be elaborated upon.").
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interest is simply not sufficiently compelling to justify a seizure by
killing." 2 However, where a violent suspect does pose a significant
danger, and necessity requires, a seizure by means of deadly force
becomes reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.2" 3 Garnerand Lee
thus represent the Court's occasional implicit acceptance of defining
Fourth Amendment reasonableness by reference to the sufficiency or
"compelling" nature of government interests.
However, under the proposed strict scrutiny model, a
"compelling interest" will not be enough to justify a warrantless
search. 4 This principle gains support from the Court's decision in
Mincey v. Arizona. After a narcotics raid of the suspect's apartment,
in which an officer was shot and killed, narcotics officers immediately
looked throughout the apartment for other victims, finding the
defendant, his girlfriend and three accomplices in two different rooms.20 6
Refraining from further examination, the officers waited ten minutes for
homicide detectives to arrive. 7 Upon arrival, the detectives conducted
an exhaustive four-day warrantless search of the suspect's apartment.20 8
The premises were searched, photographed, and diagrammed in their
entirety.20 9 Every closet, room, cupboard, and drawer was opened and
examined while portions of the carpet were torn up and removed. 10
Rejecting a so-called "murder scene exception" to the warrant
requirement, the Court invalidated the detective's search for lack of a
warrant or exigency."' Explicitly noting the importance of the state

202 See Garner,471 U.S. at 11.
203

Id.

204 See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
205
20

437 U.S. 385 (1978).

208

Id. at 387-90.
Id. at 389.

6Id. at 388.
207 Id. at 388-89.
209

21o Mincey, 437 U.S. at 389.
211

Id. at 394-95.
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interest," the Court held that the full four-day exploratory warrantless

search was unreasonable where no exigency existed to justify the failure
to obtain a warrant." 3 This principle is consistent with the proposed
model which requires both "necessity" and a "compelling interest"2t 4 to
justify warrantless searches.
However, the compelling interest standard is not immune from
potential criticism. Two arguments may be leveled against importing a
compelling interest standard into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The
first is that the process of identifying which government interests are
sufficiently compelling to justify proceeding without a warrant will
ultimately vest initial discretion in police officers, which is precisely
what the Fourth Amendment guards against." 5 The second is that
reviewing courts will produce the same ad hoc judgments that
characterize the current balancing approach.2" 6 Neither argument is

persuasive. The first misjudges both the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment and the role of law enforcement, while the second fails to
recognize the increased coherence that the proposed model will bring to
constitutional law.
The Fourth Amendment was not intended to eliminate the
exercise of all law enforcement discretion,2 17 but only to guard against
212See id. at 393 ("No one can doubt the importance of... the vital public interest in the

prompt investigation of the extremely serious crime of murder.").
213See id.
214See supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
215 Cf Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 483 (1995) (characterizing
as "difficult" the task of determining which government interests are "compelling" in the
abstract).
216
See Sundby, supra note 31, at 444 (rejecting notion that proposed refinements of the
current balancing test would not improve Fourth Amendment jurisprudence so long as
elements of balancing still remain).
217 See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987) (validating police department
regulations regarding inventory searches and noting that "nothing in [our previous decisions]
prohibits the exercise of police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised according
to standard criteria"). Cf United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 448 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "police officers may, in their discretion, opt not to obtain a search
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discretion arbitrarily abused.218 Police officers are vested with no more
discretion under the proposed model than under the current approach." 9
Thus if the degree of discretion afforded the police is a reason for
rejecting the proposed model, it also is a reason for dispensing with the
current approach. Yet the proposed model imposes a higher evidentiary
burden for validating warrantless searches22 ° and requires that a search
without a warrant be the least intrusive alternative reasonably available
to serve the state's compelling interest. 221 Thus, even if the proposed
model were shown not to significantly decrease police discretion, it
provides additional procedural safeguards which the current balancing
approach does not.
The second major objection likewise raises a concern which, if
sufficient to justify rejection of the proposed model, is equally
competent to justify dispensing with the current approach, for the
"compelling interest" standard is theoretically no more amorphous than
the "reasonableness" balancing test. 222 Each model requires the Court to
identify the material concerns of both the government and society
implicated by the search in question and then assign a weight to each in
proportion to the significance of the other's concern. In practice,
however, the "compelling interest" standard, although not self-defining,
is nonetheless familiar and well-recognized.223 In determining what

warrant the moment they have probable cause to search"); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1)
(permitting police officers to execute search warrant within ten days of its issuance).
28 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) (noting that "the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the people of the United States against
arbitrary action by their own government").
29 In fact, the proposed model limits police discretion far more than the current approach.
See220
infra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.A-B.

221See

discussion infra Part IV.C.
supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
223 The "compelling interest" standard is used in both the First and Fourteenth
Amendment context. See cases cited infra note 226. This legal concept has also been
incorporated into legislation. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a), (b)(l) (Supp. V. 1994) (providing that government entities "shall not
222See
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interests are sufficiently "compelling" to justify warrantless searches,
courts may seek guidance from the First and Fourteenth Amendment
decisions which have frequently given content to the concept of
'
"compelling interests."224
Thus, rather than being marked by a
patchwork of ad hoc decisions,225 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
could incorporate, and build upon, the familiar concepts utilized in other
areas of constitutional adjudication.226
Moreover, previously settled principles of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence may assist a decision maker in determining what interests
are "compelling" under the proposed standard.227 The Court's decision
in Welsh v. Wisconsin228 is illustrative. In Welsh, the petitioner walked
to his nearby home after his vehicle swerved off a road and onto a
field.229 Shortly thereafter, a police officer arrived and gained entrance
to the home without an arrest or search warrant.' Finding the petitioner
in his bedroom, the police arrested him for driving under the influence
of alcohol,' a civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion . . . " unless it "demonstrates that
application of the burden ... is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest").
224 See infra note 226.
225See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
226 Since different constitutional provisions represent and protect different values, it is of
course possible that the same government interest may be "compelling" for purposes of
adjudication under one constitutional provision but not for another. This, however, does not
mean that a court cannot seek guidance in construing rights under one provision from the law
which has developed under another provision. For example, under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the Court's strict scrutiny requires that legislative
classifications based upon race be necessary to the achievement of a compelling state
interest. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989). This same standard is used in the First
Amendment context to review content based restrictions on the freedom of speech. Madsen
v. Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753, 761 (1994) (citing Perry Educ. Assoc. v. Perry
Local Educators' Assoc., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
227See, e.g., infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text. See also cases cited supra note
158 and accompanying text.
228

466 U.S. 740 (1984).

229

Id. at 742.
Id. at 743.
Id.

230
231
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possible.232 Rejecting the state's argument that exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless home arrest,233 the Court struck it down, holding
that an important factor to consider is "the gravity of the underlying
offense" allegedly committed.3 Since the underlying offense was noncriminal, the state's minimal interest was insufficient to justify the home
arrest without a warrant.235 Thus, under the proposed model, both
reviewing courts and law enforcement, looking for guidance, may follow
Welsh for the proposition that "compelling interests" are to be defined
by reference to the gravity of the offense,236 which in turn can largely be
determined by the penalty provided therefore.23 7 Because in most
instances, the penalty scheme will be provided in the state's penal law,
"compelling interests" may readily be identified not only by courts, but
by officers in the sound exercise of discretion in exigent
circumstances.238 In this way, the common use of familiar concepts of
constitutional law both informs the exercise of police discreton and
lessens the occasion for ad hoc value judgments by reviewing courts.239

Id. at 754.
233The state's relevant exigency theory was premised upon the need to preserve evidence
232

of the petitioner's blood/alcohol level. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753.
234 Id. at 753.
231See id. at 754 ("Given this expression of the state's interest, a warrantless home arrest
cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the petitioner's blood/alcohol level might have
dissipated while the police obtained a warrant."). The importance of the state interest
appears to be a central element of determining reasonableness under the Welsh approach.
The Court noted that given the minimal state interest (as defined by the penalty scheme for
the underlying offense), even assuming that "an imminent destruction of evidence" existed,
the police would not have been justified in proceeding without a warrant. Id. at 754.
236 Id. at 753.
237
Id. at 754 n.14.
238See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754.
239 In addition, by defining "compelling interests" at least in part by reference to the
sentencing provisions of the penal law, judicial decisions become more predictable and more
reliable for purposes of staredecisis. The proposed standard would thereby answer a chief
criticism of the current balancing approach. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
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Strict scrutiny would thus answer the most basic criticisms leveled
against the current balancing approach. 4

C. The Least Intrusive Alternative Component
Of course, "law enforcement interests should intrude on privacy
interests only to the minimal extent necessary."24' Introducing a "least
intrusive alternative" requirement to the Fourth Amendment would

elevate that principle to a crucial role in evaluating the reasonableness
of any warrantless search. 42 Yet, despite the immediate appeal of this
principle,243 the Supreme Court has generally failed to integrate it into

240 Id.
241

Sundby, supra note 31, at 443.
Strossen, supra note 11!, passim. As used in this Article, the "least intrusive

242See

alternative" principle is directed to the particular law enforcement method utilized to serve
the state's "compelling interest," and not to the proper scope of a warrantless search. Thus,
for example, in circumstances where officers may lawfully either seize a closed container
while securing a warrant for its search, or search the container immediately, the proposed
model would require the officers to seize the container because in most instances that method
least intrudes upon legitimate privacy expectations. The scope of any warrantless search
thus undertaken is an analytically distinct issue. See supra notes 172-83 and accompanying
text. Given this definition, this Article's proposed model differs significantly from that
proposed by Professor Strossen's thoughtful Article, which analyzes the scope of a search
under the least restrictive alternative principle. See Strossen, supra note I 1l, at, 1215
(arguing that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which carefully limited the scope of a "frisk"
search, can be read to support a least restrictive alternative principle in the Fourth
Amendment context). Moreover, Professor Strossen's Article argues that searches and
seizures should only be subjected to the "means" portion of the strict scrutiny test, id. at
1242, while this Article proposes that both the "means" and "ends" portions of the strict
scrutiny model apply-and then only to warrantless searches. See supra notes 154-55 and
accompanying text.
243See Strossen, supra note 111, at 1238 ("Ifthe benefits which flow from one measure
could be substantially achieved through a second measure entailing lesser costs, the latter
should surely be deemed more reasonable ... than the former.").
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,... resulting in an anomalous
'
inconsistency in the Court's jurisprudence of "fundamental rights."245
The Fourth Amendment is at least as fundamental as the First
Amendment in the constitutional scheme.246 Yet, the Court requires
governmental burdens of First Amendment rights to comply with the
least restrictive alternative principle,247 while no such requirement has
been imposed in the. Fourth Amendment context.24 8 Adoption of the
proposed model would eliminate this constitutional incongruity.
However, two main objections to the least intrusive alternative
in the Fourth Amendment context have been raised. The first objection
is that it would involve the judiciary in "unrealistic second-guessing" of
law enforcement,249 while a second criticism is that such a requirement
would "unduly hamper the police's ability to make swift, on-the-spot
decisions."25' Neither, however, persuasively counsels against adopting

244 Sce,

e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) ("The reasonableness of the

officer's decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive
investigatory techniques."); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 629
n.9 (1989) ("The reasonableness of any particular government activity does not necessarily
or invariably turn on the existence of alternative 'less intrusive' means."); Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) (rejecting least intrusive alternative principle); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 n.40 (1979) (criticizing least intrusive alternative principle but
assuming its relevance to issue of reasonableness); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 557 n. 12 (1976) ("The logic of... elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments
could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers.").
245 See supra text accompanying notes 136-50.
246 See supra text accompanying notes 136-50.
247

See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("[Elven though the

governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved."); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("The government
may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated
interest.").
241 See cases cited supra note 244.
249 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (quoting United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985)).
250 Id.
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the proposed model because the first underestimates the ability of the
Court while the second misjudges the ability of law enforcement.
Since the least intrusive alternative principle has been
" ' it would
incorporated into a significant number of constitutional areas,25
seem that the Court's concern with "unrealistic second-guessing" would
be a reason for dispensing with the requirement in those areas as well.
Yet this has not occurred.252 For instance, the Court has not been
plagued by an inability to evaluate less restrictive alternative methods
in the First Amendment context.253 Because there is no reason to think
that the Court's expertise in the First Amendment context is any greater
than in the Fourth Amendment context,254 there is little reason to think
that the least intrusive alternative analysis cannot be successfully
implemented into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 2"
Moreover, the courts often would not be required to imagine
alternative methods less intrusive on privacy.256 Procedurally, the party
seeking to justify the warrantless search could be required to show that
less intrusive alternatives were not reasonably available. 7 Such an

251 See

Strossen, supra note I 1, at 1208 ("The least intrusive alternative principle has a

long history of acceptance in a number of legal contexts ....
[lit has been applied in a
growing number of constitutional ... contexts.").
252 The least restrictive alternative principle continues to be an integral element of the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. See cases cited infra note 253.
253See, e.g., R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 395 (1992) (noting that the City had at its disposal
alternative methods to achieve its compelling goals without infringing on First Amendment
rights); Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607-09 (invalidating statute which mandated a
closed courtroom during testimony of minor sexual abuse victims because permitting trial
judge to decide whether to close courtroom on case-by-case basis would be less intrusive
upon First Amendment); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (White, J., dissenting)
(cataloguing numerous less restrictive alternatives to the type of regulation of non-obscene
expressive First Amendment protected nude dancing specified in state statute).
24 Strossen, supra note 11, at 1246.
255See id., passim; see also infra text accompanying notes 267-301.
256 See id; see also infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
257See, e.g., State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977, 981 (N.H. 1985) (holding as a matter of state
constitutional law that prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures required that the
state "prove that no less intrusive means are available to accomplish the State's goal"); see
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evidentiary burden would also provide incentive to the opposing party
to come forward with potential alternative methods which were not
utilized.25 Thus the Court's role would largely be to evaluate the
"reasonableness" of the law enforcement methods proffered by the
litigants; and determining "reasonableness" is precisely what the Fourth
Amendment requires.259 Yet, rather than approaching the question with
a standard-less balancing test with all its complications,26
"reasonableness" would simply be defined by the relative intrusiveness
of each of the proffered law enforcement methods. Whichever method
is least intrusive upon legitimate privacy expectations would be the
"reasonable" method for Fourth Amendment purposes. This analysis
should be relatively easy for the Court which is particularly able to
6
evaluate the intrusiveness of various law enforcement practices.1 1

In fact, a plurality of the Court, in Floridav. Royer,2 62 had no
difficulty suggesting an alternative law enforcement method which, if
implemented, would have lessened the intrusion upon the suspect's

also Strossen, supra note I 11, at 1255.
25$Cf Brief for Respondent at 40-43, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489

U.S. 602 (1989) (challenging warrantless drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees, by
suggesting numerous alternative and less intrusive means to serve the government's interest).
259See supra note 2; see also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) ("The
relevant test is...
whether the search was reasonable.").
260 See supra Part II.
261See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S.Ct. 882, 886 (1997) (arguing that once an
automobile has been lawfully stopped, the additional intrusion of ordering passengers out
of the vehicle is "minimal"); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (explicitly noting
that in determining reasonableness, "one of the factors is the extent of the intrusion");
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (characterizing as a "substantial" intrusion, the
proposed surgery into suspect's chest to recover a bullet); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 110 (1977) (deciding that intrusion occasioned by officer's request of driver to exit the
vehicle during lawful traffic stop was "de minimis"); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,
894-95 (1975) (noting that checkpoint stops of passing motorists are "far less intrusive" than
roving patrol stops); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (characterizing a "frisk" search for
weapons as a "brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the
person").
262460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality).
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privacy.263 The Royer plurality noted that the use of trained narcotics

dogs to investigate the presence of illegal drugs in a suspect's luggage,264
would have been a less intrusive alternative to the officers' opening the
luggage themselves without a warrant.265
Likewise, the courts of those states which have implemented the
least intrusive alternative principle as a matter of state constitutional law

have had little difficulty assessing the availability of alternative, less
intrusive methods.

266

For instance, in State v. Sierra,267 police officers

arrested a foreign-speaking suspect believed to be in the country
illegally. 26 During the booking process, prior to placing the defendant
in the county jail, the officers ordered the defendant to empty his pockets

and proceeded to open and search the defendant's suitcase without a

warrant. 269 Rejecting the state's argument that the warrantless search
was permissible under the inventory search exception to the warrant
27
requirement, 270 the Montana Supreme Court invalidated the search. 1
The Court reasoned that under state constitutional law, the less intrusive
method of securing one of two available interpreters to ask the defendant

what should be done with his suitcase must be employed prior to
searching without a warrant.272
263Id. at 505-06.
264The Supreme Court has indicated that the use of trained narcotics dogs to investigate

the presence of illegal drugs in closed luggage is not generally a "search" for Fourth
Amendment purposes. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). Recently, law
enforcement has increasingly relied on trained narcotics detection dogs to interdict drug
trafficking. See People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1055 (N.Y. 1990).
265 Royer, 460 U.S. at 505-06.
266 See infra note 267-87 and accompanying text.
267 692 P.2d 1273 (Mont. 1985).
268 Id. at 1274-75.
269 Id. at 1275.
270 See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (validating warrantless search of
property within arrestee's possession under inventory search exception to warrant
requirement reasoning that inventory of items safeguards the property, and protects police
from false claims of loss or theft and possible danger from undiscovered items).
271Sierra, 692 P.2d at 1276-77.
272 Id. at 1275.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

19971

583

Similarly, in Reeves v. State2 73 the Alaska Supreme Court
invalidated a warrantless inventory search on least-intrusive alternative
grounds. The defendant in Reeves was arrested for driving under the
influence of an intoxicating liquor.2 74 At the correctional facility,
officers removed from the defendant's pocket an opaque toy balloon.275
Opening the balloon without a warrant, the officers discovered a small
amount of narcotics. 2 76 Reeves was subsequently charged with illegal
possession of a narcotic drug.2 77 Relying on an inventory search
rationale, the state argued that the warrantless search was a valid means
of protecting the defendant's property during incarceration and of
insulating the police from false claims of loss or theft.2 78 Both purposes,
the Court reasoned, could be achieved by the less intrusive method of
securing and properly storing the arrestee's possessions in a property bag
and obtaining the arrestee's signature on an inventory sheet listing all of
the property items seized.279
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Hawaii has held that the Hawaii
Constitution's Fourth Amendment analogue280 requires that the purposes
of warrantless inventory searches must be accomplished by the least
intrusive alternative reasonably available. In State v. Kaluna,2"8' the
Court reasoned that in order to protect an internee's property and insulate
the police from missing property claims, a closed tissue paper packet
seized from an arrestee could have been deposited in a sealed envelope
rather than opened and searched.282 Numerous other state courts have

273 599

P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979).
730.

274 Id. at
275

id.

276 id.
277 id.
27'

Reeves, 599 P.2d at 736-37.

279

id.
280HAW. CONST. art. 1,§ 5 provides citizens of Hawaii with a substantive right to be free

from unreasonable searches and seizures.
21 520 P.2d 51 (Haw. 1974).
282Id. at 374-75.
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'
similarly held that "the constitutional rule of reason"283
requires
invalidation of warrantless searches where less intrusive investigative
techniques are reasonably available.28 4 The existing alternatives

suggested by this growing body of state constitutional law seem well

within the realm of both judicial competence and law enforcement
capability. Given the simplicity of such reasonable alternatives, the
'
concern with involving the court in "unrealistic second-guessing"285
seems itself unrealistic.

In addition, the second major objection to the least intrusive
alternative... seems inventive, for it fails to adequately assess the
abilities of law enforcement.28 7

Police officers should have little

difficulty complying with the least intrusive alternative principle.288
After all, police officers, perhaps better than anyone else, are aware of

the various law enforcement investigative techniques available in a
variety of settings.289 They also are in the best position to know which
technique is best suited to the developing facts before them.29° Thus, if
283 Id. at 374.
284See, e.g., State v. Perham, 814 P.2d 914 (Haw. 1991); State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977

(N.H. 1985); State v. Ching, 678 P.2d 1088, 1092-93 (Haw. 1984) (holding that in the
absence of exigent circumstances, police must handle recovered lost property by the less
intrusive means of enclosing it in a sealed container rather than opening it for inventory
purposes); People v. Bayles, 411 N.E.2d 1346 (Il. 1980) (invalidating warrantless search
of closed suitcase found at accident scene because purposes of inventory search could have
been achieved by the less intrusive method of obtaining a warrant); State v. Keller, 510 P.2d
568 (Or. 1973)(noting that police should have used less intrusive method of obtaining a
warrant prior to opening closed fishing tackle box suspected of carrying drugs); People v.
Superior Court of California, 82 Cal. Rptr. 766, 770 (Cal. 1969) (invalidating warrantless
police entry of vehicle thought to have been burglarized because less intrusive means of
running license check could have been used to obtain owner's identity).
285 See supra note 249.
286 See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
287 See infra note 288-300 and accompanying text.
288 See infra note 288-300 and accompanying text.
289
See, e.g., PETER SCHARF & ARNOLD BINDER, THE BADGE AND THE BULLET: POLICE
USE OF DEADLY FORCE 95-136 (1983) (discussing the ability of police to make numerous
split-second law enforcement decisions under life threatening conditions).
290 See id.
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required to follow the course which is least intrusive, the police, perhaps
even better than the court, know what course that would be.29' Since the
police are the "experts" at law enforcement, there seems to be little
reason to suppose that requiring them to choose which investigative
method is least intrusive, given the facts before them, would hamper
their ability to "make on-the-spot decisions."2' 92 The facts of Terry v.
Ohio 293 provide a clear example.
In Terry, Officer McFadden's suspicions were aroused by two
men whose behavior lead McFadden to believe, in light of his law
enforcement experience, that a robbery was about to take place. 94 Faced
with the threat of danger to himself,295 and the need to make "a quick
decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible
danger, '296 McFadden managed not only to neutralize the danger, but
did so while confining his acts "strictly to what was minimally
necessary."2' 97 There is no reason to believe that Officer McFadden's

291This

suggestion is not inconsistent with permitting the Court to review police action

to determine whether the least intrusive alternative was implemented in individual cases.
Although police knowledge of law enforcement techniques may be superior to that of the
Court, the Court's knowledge of what the Fourth Amendment requires is superior to that of
the police. In addition, the police may use their expertise to aid the Court in its review of
police action. See supra text accompanying notes 256-59.
292See infra notes 293-300 and accompanying text.
293 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
294Id. at 5-6.
295The Court noted that "[t]he sole justification of the search in the present situation is
the 29protection
of the police officer and others nearby .... Id. at 29.
6
Id.at 28.
297Id. at 30. Since at the time of the encounter, the Court had not yet decided that officers
could conduct "frisk" searches on less than probable cause, McFadden's investigative
methods showed remarkable restraint. Prior to searching, McFadden observed the suspects'
suspicious conduct for approximately ten to twelve minutes. Id. at 6. McFadden then
approached the suspects, fearing they had a gun, first introduced himself and then asked for
their names. Id. at 6-7. Only when he received a mumbled response did McFadden search
the defendant, Terry, and then only patted down the outer clothing until he felt a weapon
inside. Id. at 7.
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ability to react reasonably in a crisis situation does not reflect the ability
of most officers.298
In fact, since police officers in those states which have
implemented the least intrusive alternative principle299 have not been
handicapped in their ability to make swift decisions during the
performance of their duties, there is little reason to think that such a
result would follow from incorporating the requirement into the Fourth
Amendment. Thus the proposed strict scrutiny model would provide
heightened protection to privacy interests while demanding no more of
law enforcement officers than what they are capable of providing."'

Summary
The rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment are exceedingly
important to anyone concerned with the breadth of government power
in a free society. Today those rights are being attacked by strong
political forces determined to eliminate drugs and violence from this
nation's streets by increasing the power of the police to conduct
warrantless searches. Yet the choice is not between safe streets and
Fourth Amendment values. The proposal made by this Article has
attempted to make that clear. Striking a proper balance between Fourth
Amendment rights and legitimate law enforcement needs can be
accomplished through adoption of the strict scrutiny model.

29 In fact police officers frequently demonstrate an ability, not only to assess the

surrounding circumstances, but to quickly make a decision to use less intrusive law
enforcement techniques when faced with life-threatening armed confrontations. See SCHARF
& BINDER, supra note 289, at 95-136.
299 See cases cited supra note 284.
300 In fact, experience from state courts has taught that determining less intrusive
alternatives will frequently entail merely common-sense, practical judgments rather than
complicated legal technicalities. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 266-84 and
sources cited supra note 284.
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The proposed approach, by promoting the use of warrants, and
requiring rigorous justification for failing to do so, would refocus the
Court's attention on the central meaning of the Fourth
Amendment-protection from overzealous government action. At the
same time, the proposal is sufficiently flexible to permit law
enforcement to combat crime without being unduly hindered by the
warrant requirement in emergency situations. The standard recognizes
that police officers must often react immediately to avert developing
crises, yet in so doing, must not cavalierly disregard legitimate privacy
expectations. The familiar standards of constitutional law utilized by the
proposal thus seek to guide the Court's reasonableness inquiry into
warrantless searches. This, in turn should permit the courts to develop
a more consistent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for police officers
to follow.
The "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures" is not a
mere form of words; nor is it to be lightly dismissed at the mere
incantation of a "government interest." Winning drug convictions by
eviscerating the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment will, in
time, exact a heavy toll on individual liberty. The danger of our
continued misguided attempts to solve social ills by restricting the right
of the individual lies in the sobering reality that when the national fervor
has quieted, and the "great danger" has passed, the precedents will
endure. Throughout the nation, it is increasingly routine for citizens to
suffer the indignity, embarrassment and inconvenience of unjustified
warrantless police searches-all in the name of the government's drug
war. We will do well to remember when the politics of a very different
war moved the Court to approve tactics previously unknown to a free
society.3"' I would have thought that that indefensible mistake would not
so soon be forgotten.

3'0See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

